Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and previous Review Conference outcomes

Report submitted by Germany

Introduction

1. Germany considers the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to be the cornerstone of the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. Germany is committed to the universal validity of the Treaty.

2. Germany welcomed the adoption of the forward-looking action plan in 2010 as a contribution to strengthening the Treaty in its totality. The action plan draws upon the 13 practical steps agreed on at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and offers guidance on their effective implementation. The action plan requires progress on all aspects of the Treaty, since non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy are intrinsically interconnected. Germany is cooperating with its partners, particularly within the European Union and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative.

3. With regard to nuclear disarmament, Germany is convinced that further progress is needed to achieve the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world in line with article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. While Germany is firmly committed to its obligations within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance, it is resolved to help create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Within this context, a new disarmament round between the United States of America and the Russian Federation should begin as soon as possible and should also address substrategic nuclear weapons. Parallel to further quantitative reductions, the role of nuclear weapons in all security doctrines and their operational readiness should be further diminished. In line with the action plan, all nuclear-weapon States should increase transparency with respect to their arsenals. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty must finally enter into force, and negotiations on a treaty prohibiting the

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production of fissile material should begin in the near future. As the Conference on Disarmament moves into its eighteenth consecutive year of stalemate, Germany is concerned about the Conference's functionality as the sole permanent multilateral disarmament treaty negotiating body. The Conference's ability to address the security needs of the international community is in serious doubt.

4. With regard to non-proliferation, Germany is actively involved in finding a diplomatic solution to the current proliferation crises, which could jeopardize the integrity of the Treaty. Germany commends the crucial work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as the custodian of the Treaty, via its safeguards system. Germany is the third-largest contributor to the IAEA budget. Germany also calls upon all States to adopt the IAEA Additional Protocol as the nuclear verification standard. With respect to its export policy, Germany is applying a "catch-all" approach requiring the control of non-listed but potentially sensitive items. Germany is also promoting the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) via the Wiesbaden process, which is facilitating dialogue with industry.

5. As far as the peaceful use of nuclear energy is concerned, Germany is contributing to technical cooperation through its substantial support of the IAEA work in this field. Germany is active in the area of nuclear security and has joined all pertinent instruments designed to help prevent nuclear terrorism and reduce nuclear risks.

6. For good reason, reporting requirements are an important part of the action plan. They help increase transparency and build trust among partners. In this context, Germany submits its own reports in connection with action 20 of the 2010 action plan.

Article-by-article review, including the 13 practical steps

I. Nuclear disarmament

Action 1

7. Germany considers the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. Germany is committed to complying with the Treaty in the strictest and most comprehensive fashion. This includes fulfilling its obligations under the safeguards agreement with IAEA.

Action 2

8. Germany reiterates its commitment to applying the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of its treaty obligations.

Action 6

9. As a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Germany supports the establishment of a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work. Germany has consistently called for the adoption by the Conference of a programme of work that would provide for the implementation of this action, and it has indeed actively supported all draft programmes of work to this effect that have been submitted to

the Conference for adoption in recent years (CD/1864 in 2009, CD/1933/Rev.1 in 2012 and CD/1948 and Corr.1 in 2013).

Action 7

10. As a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Germany supports the discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work. Germany has consistently called for the adoption by the Conference of a programme of work that would provide for the implementation of this action, and it has indeed actively supported all draft programmes of work to this effect that have been submitted to the Conference in recent years (CD/1864 in 2009, CD/1933/Rev.1 in 2012 and CD/1948 and Corr.1 in 2013).

Action 9

11. Germany considers nuclear-weapon-free zones to be of great value on the way to achieving the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Germany supports the dialogue between members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the nuclear-weapon States on the possible signature by those States of the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. With respect to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, Germany urges all States concerned to reach agreement on the remaining differences.

12. Germany continues to support the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region.

Action 10

13. Germany was among the first countries (the nineteenth State) to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in 1998.

Actions 11 and 12

14. The Federal Government outlined Germany's outreach activities regarding the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty during the article XIV conferences held in New York on 23 September 2011 and 27 September 2013. Furthermore, Germany has been promoting the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a new member of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (since May 2013) and is also represented in the newly established Group of Eminent Persons by former Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Executive Secretary Wolfgang Hoffmann.

Action 13

15. Germany continues to stress the importance of the early entry into force of the Treaty at all levels and urges its signature and ratification, in particular by the remaining Annex 2 States, in high-level talks, public statements and relevant multilateral forums. As a member of the European Union, Germany has firmly supported the European Union's statements, positions and voluntary contributions promoting the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and its

verification system, as well as the European Union's outreach activities to this end. As a member of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Germany actively supports all Initiative statements promoting the early entry into force and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. As a member of the Group of Eight (G8), Germany actively supported the G8 démarches urging ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

16. Germany regularly co-sponsors the annual General Assembly resolution, which stresses the fundamental importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and calls for its early entry into force.

Action 14

17. Germany hosts five monitoring stations in the International Monitoring System — two seismological and two infrasound stations as well as a radionuclide station.

18. Germany also actively assists the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in building on the verification regime, through close cooperation and by providing experts for developing on-site inspection procedures.

Action 15

19. Germany attaches fundamental importance to the early commencement of negotiations on an effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, commonly referred to as "fissile material cut-off treaty". Germany considers negotiations on a treaty banning the future production of such material while dealing with existing material in an appropriate way as the next logical step along the path towards a world without nuclear weapons.

20. Germany has long been among the advocates of a treaty on fissile material. The Federal Government has pushed hard for the commencement of fissile material cut-off treaty negotiations and continues to do so. In the Conference on Disarmament, it argues vigorously in favour of the adoption of a programme of work which includes the start of fissile material cut-off treaty negotiations. In 2008, Germany submitted to the 2008 Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference, as a conceptual contribution, a working paper entitled "Creating New Momentum for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty". In November 2009, the Federal Foreign Office hosted an international conference in Berlin entitled "Towards an FMCT: Significance, Political Context and Technical Implications", in which representatives from 44 States participated. Its aim was to support the work of the Conference on Disarmament by inviting senior experts and diplomats to discuss key aspects of a future fissile material cut-off treaty.

21. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 66/44, adopted by the Assembly at its sixty-sixth session, Germany, together with the Netherlands, organized two scientific expert meetings featuring technical discussions in Geneva in 2012, in which representatives of 45 States participated, to help prepare the ground for fissile material cut-off treaty negotiations under the auspices of the Conference on

Disarmament (see reports contained in documents CD/1935 of 26 June 2012 and CD/1943 of 13 September 2012).

22. Germany's Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed the high-level meeting on revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations, held in New York on 24 September 2010, and underlined Germany's great concern about the continuing failure of the Conference to resume substantive work.

23. Germany has consistently called for the adoption by the Conference of a programme of work that would allow fissile material cut-off treaty negotiations to commence, and has indeed actively supported all draft programmes of work to this effect that have been submitted to the Conference for adoption in recent years (CD/1864, CD/1933/Rev.1 and CD/1948 and Corr.1).

24. As a result of Germany's profile in matters related to the fissile material cut-off treaty, on 24 October 2013 the German Government was invited to participate in the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 67/53, entitled "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" and adopted by the General Assembly at its sixty-seventh session.

Action 18

25. Germany has never had facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Action 19

26. Germany is committed to improving cooperation. Germany has supported various events designed to stimulate debate with civil society organizations, such as the Middle Powers Initiative Conference held in Berlin in February 2013.

Action 21

27. Together with the other members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Germany has drafted a standard reporting form, which could be used by the nuclear-weapon States. Germany welcomes the dialogue of the nuclear-weapon States on this issue and hopes that it will produce concrete results which can be presented at the third session of the Preparatory Committee, in 2014.

Action 22

28. Germany welcomes the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General regarding the Organization's study on disarmament and non-proliferation education. At the federal level, Germany is actively informing the public about disarmament. Germany is also contributing to the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship, Training and Advisory Services Programme.

II. Nuclear non-proliferation

Action 23

29. Germany calls upon all non-Treaty States to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and without preconditions.

Action 24

30. Germany has some of the world's leading nuclear safeguards and security regimes in place.

Action 25

31. Germany calls upon all States that have not yet done so to conclude and implement comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA.

Action 28

32. Germany has a strong interest in an effective and efficient global IAEA Safeguards System and has therefore supported all efforts to strengthen this cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime. The implementation of the Additional Protocol in particular has great potential for introducing a new dimension to cooperation between member States and IAEA. The Additional Protocol entered into force in Germany and the then 15 European Union member States in April 2004. Germany calls upon all States that have not yet done so to sign and bring into force the Additional Protocol.

Action 29

33. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative has offered support to all countries interested in implementing the Additional Protocol.

Action 30

34. Germany aligns itself with the recommendations of the working paper on this subject submitted by the Non-Proliferation Disarmament Initiative in 2013 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.23).

Action 33

35. Germany pays the third-largest annual contribution to the regular budget of IAEA. In addition, Germany has volunteered 7 million euros for the "Enhancing Capabilities of the Safeguards Analytical Services" (ECAS) project to modernize the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory in Seibersdorf.

36. In connection with the IAEA secretariat's initiative to expand the Agency's Network of Analytical Laboratories, the German Government nominated the Forschungszentrum Jülich as a candidate for membership of the Network of Analytical Laboratories in February 2013.

Action 34

37. In 1978, IAEA and the Federal Republic of Germany formally established the Joint Programme on the Technical Development and Further Improvement of IAEA Safeguards, also referred to as the German Support Programme.

38. The overall aim of the German Support Programme is to cooperate with IAEA in developing state-of-the-art methods and techniques, to ensure the implementation of the developed methods and techniques, and to provide training, expert advice and consultancy on safeguards issues.

39. With more than 35 years of experience in safeguards research and development and the appropriate research networks, Germany will continue to support IAEA.

Action 35

40. As an active member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Germany organizes its export licensing procedure in accordance with the objectives of the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines. Germany thus strictly complies with the fundamental principles for safeguards and export controls in connection with nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear-weapon State and, in the case of controls on retransfers, to any State. Germany exercises a policy of restraint with respect to transfers of sensitive facilities, equipment, technology and material which could potentially be used for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Moreover, Germany pursues a "catch-all approach" with regard to export controls, which also includes the control of non-listed but potentially sensitive items.

Action 36

41. Germany has comprehensive legislation to ensure the effective implementation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines, including export licensing regulations, enforcement measures, and penalties for violations. Within the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Germany is also working to further develop and improve the Guidelines and nuclear-weapon-related export controls and supports other States in strengthening their export control mechanisms.

Action 37

42. In accordance with the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines, Germany transfers trigger list items or related technology to a non-nuclear-weapon State only on condition that the receiving State has brought into force an agreement with IAEA requiring the application of safeguards on all source and special fissionable material to its current and future peaceful activities.

Action 41

43. Germany applies the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected)) and other relevant international instruments, as well as the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

Action 42

44. Germany adheres to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on 21 October 2010. Germany actively supported international efforts to obtain the quorum for its entry into force. Germany fully respects the Convention and the Amendment to it and acts in accordance with their objectives and purposes.

Action 43

45. See response to action 41.

Action 44

46. Germany has taken part in international information-sharing on the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials through its involvement in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database, the IAEA Nuclear Security Information Portal and the Implementation and Assessment Group of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) cooperates within the framework of the INTERPOL Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives Terrorism Prevention Programme, the joint INTERPOL/Europol project "Rutherford" and the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear working group of the European Explosive Ordnance Disposal Network, all of which address illicit trafficking in nuclear or other radioactive materials. Since 2011, the Federal Customs Administration has more than doubled the number of mobile radiation measurement devices. The new highly sensitive radiation gauges enable customs authorities to perform customs controls more efficiently. Furthermore, a special chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incident-reporting scheme for the police and customs was implemented in July 2012.

47. For Germany, the evaluation of its national nuclear security regulatory framework is an ongoing process involving all relevant authorities. Since 2010, numerous regulations have been amended or rewritten. An evaluated design basis threat for nuclear facilities, a new guideline for intermediate storage and a new regulatory framework for cybersecurity including a national design basis threat, have entered into force. The regulatory framework for nuclear transports, including a national design basis threat, has been drafted and is expected to be implemented in 2014.

48. Germany actively supports the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and attended Global Initiative plenary meetings in Daejeon, Republic of Korea, in June 2011 and in Mexico City in May 2013. In cooperation with the European Commission, Germany organized a Global Initiative workshop on core capabilities in nuclear forensics at the Institute for Transuranium Elements in Karlsruhe, Germany, in May 2011.

49. Germany has continued to make large-scale contributions to its G8 Global Partnership projects in Russia. Nuclear security has been dramatically improved, specifically by dismantling decommissioned nuclear submarines from Russia's Northern Fleet and by securing sensitive nuclear installations and materials.

Action 45

50. Germany ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2007.

Action 46

51. Germany is actively supporting IAEA activities in this field.

III. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Action 53

52. Germany is making a substantial contribution to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme and thereby fostering the responsible development of nuclear technology in the areas of human health, food and agriculture, with a focus on nuclear and radiation safety.

Action 59

53. Germany adheres to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

Action 63

54. Germany adheres to the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris Convention) and the Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention.

IV. The Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East

55. Germany supports the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It commends the tireless efforts of the facilitator and calls upon all States concerned to engage in dialogue in a constructive spirit and with a willingness to compromise. It regards the Conference as the starting point for a process which would help to strengthen trust between all players and, at the same time, pave the way for establishing a zone free from weapons of mass destruction.

Other regional issues

56. North Korea's nuclear and missile programmes continue to give great cause for concern. North Korea has stepped up its missile and nuclear programmes in recent years. On 12 December 2012, North Korea successfully tested a long-range missile, and on 12 February 2013, it conducted a nuclear test. Both events amounted to flagrant violations of the pertinent Security Council resolutions. The Federal Government immediately and resolutely condemned the events. Germany has worked to achieve strongly worded resolutions from the Security Council as well as

the further tightening of sanctions, also via the European Union. North Korea must abandon its missile and nuclear programmes as the relevant Security Council resolutions call for, and return to the negotiating table. Germany strongly urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abandon its nuclear programmes completely, verifiably and irreversibly, to refrain from ballistic missile tests and to fulfil the commitments made during the Six-Party Talks in accordance with the September 2005 Joint Statement. Germany fully implements all relevant nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament obligations, including relevant Security Council resolutions, Council of the European Union decisions and European Union autonomous sanctions.

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Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by New Zealand

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to action 20 of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I). That action plan stipulates that "States parties should submit regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, on the implementation of the present action plan, as well as of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled 'Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament', and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996." At the 2010 Review Conference, States parties also recognized that nuclear disarmament and achieving the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons will require openness and cooperation. States parties affirmed the importance of enhanced confidence through increased transparency and effective verification.

2. In the Final Document, a number of actions on transparency were agreed. Under action 2, all States parties committed themselves to applying the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their Treaty obligations. Under action 5, the nuclear-weapon States committed themselves to accelerating concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament and were called upon to promptly engage so as to, inter alia, "further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence" and to report back to the Preparatory Committee at its third session in 2014 on the undertakings set out in action 5. Under action 19, all States agreed on the importance of supporting cooperation among Governments, the United Nations, other international and regional organizations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament. Under action 21, all the nuclear-weapon States were encouraged, as a confidence-building measure, to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security.

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3. New Zealand takes the view that transparency is a principle to which all States, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike, should adhere because it helps reinforce compliance with Treaty obligations. The more that is known about the manner in which States implement their Treaty commitments, the greater the level of international trust in the regime. In this spirit, New Zealand has consistently lodged transparency reports since the 2000 Review Conference and, in the light of action 20, will continue to do so.

4. New Zealand is a strong supporter of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its three pillars. We are dedicated to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons, and we continue to encourage national, regional and global efforts to realize this goal. We note the importance of the undertakings agreed upon during the review conferences, particularly the outcomes reached in 1995, 2000 and 2010, which represent an integral part of the Treaty regime and must be implemented.

5. New Zealand takes the obligations under article VI and the commitments agreed upon at subsequent review conferences very seriously, particularly the decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I) and Corr.2) adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, the 13 practical steps agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2000/28, vol. I) and the nuclear disarmament action points agreed upon at the 2010 Review Conference. The 2010 Review Conference action plan provides a very important blueprint for action in the short term, and New Zealand continues to take all available opportunities to urge all States parties to implement their obligations in full.

6. New Zealand is an active member of the New Agenda Coalition,[1] which promotes nuclear disarmament. Every year the members of the Coalition sponsor a General Assembly resolution entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments". In resolution 68/39, bearing that same title, the Assembly emphasized the fundamental role of the Treaty and called upon States to comply fully with their commitments. New Zealand is pleased to be associated with three working papers submitted by the members of the Coalition to the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference at its third session: an updated general working paper on nuclear disarmament (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.27), a working paper exploring how States parties might implement article VI of the Treaty (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.18), and a working paper on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.19).

7. New Zealand is pleased to work with Chile, Malaysia, Nigeria and Switzerland (the members of the De-Alerting Group) in promoting action to lower the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems. In adopting resolution 67/46, the General Assembly welcomed the opportunities provided by meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference to address the further reduction of the operational status of nuclear-weapon systems, looked forward to the reporting of the nuclear-weapon States on their undertakings in that regard to the Preparatory Committee at its third session in 2014, and called for further practical steps to be taken on this issue. The Group has presented its views on the importance of continuing to address de-alerting in this review cycle and beyond to the

[1] Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa.

Preparatory Committee at its third session in 2014 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.24). New Zealand remains committed to achieving progress in this area as part of a holistic approach to nuclear disarmament.

8. The 2010 Review Conference expressed its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. New Zealand has been a strong supporter of the efforts that have been undertaken since the Review Conference to raise awareness about this central element of the nuclear disarmament debate. New Zealand has attended and actively participated in the two international conferences that have been held since 2010, in Norway and Mexico, in order to better understand the nature and gravity of the humanitarian consequences of any use, whether intentional or accidental, of nuclear weapons. New Zealand looks forward to the third international conference on this issue, to be held in Austria later in 2014. In addition, New Zealand has supported statements presented to the first and second sessions of the 2015 Preparatory Committee and to the First Committee of the General Assembly on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. New Zealand coordinated and delivered a joint statement in 2013 to the First Committee on this issue on behalf of 125 States, all States parties to the Treaty. A key conclusion of that statement was that the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons are never used again is through their total elimination, including through fulfilling the objectives of the Treaty.

9. New Zealand remains a strong proponent of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We supported the Final Declaration adopted by the eighth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in September 2013, at which New Zealand served as Vice-President on behalf of South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East. New Zealand also associated itself with the final Joint Ministerial Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, adopted at the sixth ministerial meeting on promoting the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which was held in New York in September 2012. New Zealand was pleased that the 2010 Review Conference reaffirmed the essential role of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty within the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and the vital importance of the entry into force of that Treaty. The Treaty makes an important contribution towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, constraining the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of such weapons. New Zealand is pleased to be a core sponsor, with Australia and Mexico, of a recurrent General Assembly resolution on the Treaty, in which the Assembly has recognized the Treaty as a fundamental instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

10. New Zealand strongly supports the objective and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force, and urges all States to refrain from the testing of any nuclear devices. In this light, New Zealand has publicly condemned the nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 9 October 2006, 25 May 2009 and, most recently, 12 February 2013, which were detected by the Treaty's verification system. These constituted violations of its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions and were internationally condemned.

11. New Zealand remains disappointed that efforts to agree on a programme of work in the Conference on Disarmament, including sustained efforts since the 2010 Review Conference, have not been successful. New Zealand supports all efforts to overcome the current impasse in the Conference on Disarmament so that substantive work in the Conference can commence without further delay. It is of concern to New Zealand that the Conference is not fulfilling its potential or contributing to efforts to advance nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In this context, New Zealand supports the early negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty on fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

12. New Zealand is a firm advocate of the role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in contributing to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. New Zealand is a full party to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of 1985 (Treaty of Rarotonga) and is involved in efforts to promote greater engagement between States that are part of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

13. In 2012, New Zealand was pleased to introduce, with Brazil, a draft resolution entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas", which was adopted by the General Assembly (resolution 67/55). In that resolution, the Assembly stressed the importance of the contribution of nuclear-weapon-free zones to the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world and noted with satisfaction that all nuclear-weapon-free zones in the southern hemisphere are now in force.

14. New Zealand welcomes the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference and the agreement to convene a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It is regrettable that the conference was not held in 2012 or 2013, and we continue to call on the conveners, the facilitator and the States of the region to exert all efforts to ensure that the conference is convened as soon as possible.

15. New Zealand is an active member of the Vienna Group of Ten,[2] which produces working papers for the Preparatory Committee on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear safety, security and safeguards, export controls and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We are pleased to support the composite paper and recommendations put forward by the Vienna Group of Ten for consideration by the Preparatory Committee in 2014.

16. New Zealand is in full compliance with its article II commitments. The country's obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are legislated in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987. The concerns of New Zealand about the compliance of other non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have been expressed in various forums, including at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

17. The country's comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA came into force on 29 February 1972, with our Additional Protocol concluded on 24 September 1998. In February 2014 we were pleased to sign the modified Small

[2] Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden.

Quantities Protocol to our Safeguards Agreement. With no nuclear weapons, no nuclear energy generation, no nuclear reactors and no production of uranium or other relevant material, New Zealand conducts only very minor activities subject to safeguards. IAEA continues to assess New Zealand as being in full compliance with all its safeguards commitments.

18. New Zealand has given strong support to a system of strengthened IAEA safeguards, which is an essential component of the global non-proliferation regime. IAEA, through its safeguards, verifies assurances that States are meeting their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and provides the mechanism through which States demonstrate their compliance. Universal application of the integrated safeguards system, including the Additional Protocol, would promote collective security, and New Zealand calls upon all States that have not yet done so to conclude such agreements at the earliest possible date. New Zealand continues to look for opportunities to strengthen the application of nuclear safeguards and, to this end, is pleased to have joined the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network in April 2014.

19. New Zealand applies export controls to materials and dual-use goods that can be used in a nuclear weapons programme. We work actively to strengthen and coordinate these measures with other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and with the Zangger Committee, which New Zealand joined in November 2013.

20. New Zealand reaffirms the inalienable right of States parties to peaceful nuclear technology, in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty, and is pleased to continue its support of the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative. It remains New Zealand's view that safeguards, safety, security and waste management all need to be an integral part of the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. New Zealand remains actively engaged in international efforts to strengthen nuclear safety and security, including at the Nuclear Security Summit and through our funding of the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.

21. New Zealand continues to actively promote the safe transport of radioactive material at IAEA and other relevant forums. New Zealand is interested in ensuring that the highest possible safety standards are adopted and applied by those transporting radioactive material, that coastal and other interested States receive notification in advance of shipments and that adequate liability arrangements are in place. In September 2013 New Zealand was pleased to join a number of coastal and shipping States at IAEA in agreeing upon voluntary best practice guidelines on communication to apply to certain shipments of radioactive material.

22. New Zealand remains committed to efforts to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education. In New Zealand, funding is available through the Peace and Disarmament Education Trust for postgraduate research aimed at promoting international peace, arms control and disarmament. The Disarmament Education United Nations Implementation Fund was established in 2004 to implement the recommendations of the 2002 United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education (A/57/124). New Zealand is pleased that funding provided through the Implementation Fund supports the work of New Zealanders in promoting progress towards disarmament and non-proliferation, including in relation to nuclear weapons.

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Implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and previous Review Conference outcomes

Report submitted by Japan

1. Japan is committed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the essential foundation for the achievement of nuclear disarmament, as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and as the basis for the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

2. Japan submits the present report pursuant to action 20 of the action plan regarding regular reports, contained in the Final Document adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

3. Japan calls upon all States parties that have not yet done so to submit regular reports during this 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty review process.

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		Actions undertaken by Japan
I. Nuclear disarmament		
A. Principles and objectives		
Action 1	All States parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.	(1) The Government of Japan continues to adhere to a basic policy of observing the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" of not possessing, not manufacturing or not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into the territory of Japan. (2) Since 1994, based on the idea that a world without nuclear weapons should be achieved through concrete and effective steps, Japan has annually submitted a nuclear disarmament resolution to the United Nations General Assembly. In the most recent case, the sixty-eighth session of the Assembly adopted the draft resolution on nuclear disarmament entitled "United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons" (A/C.1/68/L.43), which Japan submitted along with a record number of 102 co-sponsor countries. This is the first time the number of co-sponsor States has exceeded 100. The draft resolution was adopted by an overwhelming majority of 169 in favour. (This is also related to actions 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 11, 21, 22, 23, 25 and 28). (3) Japan took the lead in establishing a cross-regional group called the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative* to take forward the implementation of the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. The Initiative has submitted working papers to each Preparatory Committee to contribute to the 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty review process. Japan hosted the eighth Ministerial Meeting in Hiroshima on 11 and 12 April 2014. *Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative: In 2010, 10 countries, Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, established an initiative to take forward the outcomes of the 2010 Review Conference. In 2013, two countries, Nigeria and the Philippines, joined the Initiative.

		Actions undertaken by Japan
Action 2	All States parties commit to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations.	(1) Japan submits this report on the implementation of the action plan in order to enhance transparency. (2) Japan, together with other Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative member countries, undertook to develop a draft standard nuclear disarmament reporting form as a contribution to discussions among the nuclear-weapon States. We shared the proposed reporting form with the five nuclear-weapon States in 2011. (3) Japan implemented projects on dismantling six decommissioned nuclear submarines in far east of the Russian Federation until 2009. In 2012, Japan provided three pieces of equipment for the long-term storage facility and also decided to extend additional assistance for the blast paint facility in far east of the Russian Federation, which is now under construction. (4) Japan actively participated in various meetings of Norway-United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland projects on verification of nuclear disarmament. (5) The Government of Japan submits information on the plutonium stockpile of Japan to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is circulated to all Member States of IAEA. Moreover, the Government of Japan publishes an annual report on the situation of plutonium management in the country since 1994. This approach is consistent with, and goes beyond, the international Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium adopted in 1997 and launched under the initiative of nine countries, including Japan.
B. Disarmament of nuclear weapons		
Action 3	In implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States commit to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.	N/A

		Actions undertaken by Japan
Action 4	The Russian Federation and the United States of America commit to seek the early entry into force and full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and are encouraged to continue discussions on follow-on measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals.	N/A
Action 5	The nuclear-weapon States commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security. To that end, they are called upon to promptly engage with a view to, inter alia:	N/A
Action 6	All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.	(1) Japan supports the programme of work of the Conference on Disarmament adopted in 2009 (CD/1864). Japan, as a member of the Conference on Disarmament, makes every effort to adopt a programme of work, which would enable the commencement of disarmament negotiations. (2) An open-ended working group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons was established based on General Assembly resolution 67/56 and convened in 2013. Japan, together with 12 other countries, submitted a working paper on a building block approach to contribute to the discussion. (3) The Conference on Disarmament decided to establish an informal working group to produce a programme of work in August 2013 and to re-establish it on 3 March 2014. At the same time, the Conference on Disarmament also adopted its schedule of activities on 26 March 2014. Japan, as one of six Conference on Disarmament Presidents of the 2014 session, worked closely with other Presidents and Conference members to adopt these decisions.

		Actions undertaken by Japan
C. Security assurances		
Action 7	All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument. The Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.	(1) Japan supports the programme of work of the Conference on Disarmament adopted in 2009 (CD/1864), which includes discussions on the negative security assurance. (2) At the high-level meeting on revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament in September 2010, then Foreign Minister Maehara stressed in his speech the importance of the revitalization of the Conference on Disarmament.
Action 8	All nuclear-weapon States commit to fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances. Those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so are encouraged to extend security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.	N/A
Action 9	The establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where appropriate, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, is encouraged. All concerned States are encouraged to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their relevant protocols, and to constructively consult and cooperate to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of all such nuclear-weapon free zones treaties, which include negative security assurances. The concerned States are encouraged to review any related reservations.	(1) Japan has encouraged the countries concerned, where appropriate, regarding nuclear-weapon-free zones to sign and ratify the treaties promptly at every opportunity. (2) Japan co-sponsored a draft resolution on the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (Bangkok Treaty) adopted by the General Assembly most recently in December 2013 (resolution 68/49).

		Actions undertaken by Japan
D. Nuclear testing		
Action 10	All nuclear-weapon States undertake to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty with all expediency, noting that positive decisions by nuclear-weapon States would have the beneficial impact towards the ratification of that Treaty, and that nuclear-weapon States have the special responsibility to encourage Annex 2 countries, in particular those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify.	N/A
Action 11	Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, all States commit to refrain from nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, the use of new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of that Treaty, and all existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions should be maintained.	Japan, as one of the first countries that signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, continues firmly to adhere to the object and purpose of the Treaty.
Action 12	All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty recognize the contribution of the conferences on facilitating the entry into force of that Treaty and of the measures adopted by consensus at the Sixth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in September 2009, and commit to report at the 2011 Conference on progress made towards the urgent entry into force of that Treaty.	(1) Japan recognizes the importance of the conferences on facilitating the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Mr. Koichiro Gemba, then Foreign Minister, participated in the seventh meeting in 2011 and reported Japan's efforts to facilitate the entry into force of the Treaty, through illustrating the following activities; meetings at the summit and ministerial levels to encourage the remaining Annex 2 States to sign and ratify the Treaty and training courses to support developing countries in their efforts to build up their national operation systems required for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by annually inviting seismological experts from non-signatories and non-ratifiers. (2) In 2013, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida proposed three actions to further strengthen the norm of a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests at the eighth meeting.

		Actions undertaken by Japan
Action 13	All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty undertake to promote the entry into force and implementation of that Treaty at the national, regional and global levels.	(1) Japan has been calling for the early entry into force, signature and ratification of the Treaty on various occasions, such as at bilateral meetings and international or regional forums. Before the approval of the Indonesian ratification by the Parliament, Japan used the occasion of the bilateral meetings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki to work towards the ratification and the Mayors for Peace sent letters addressed to the Chairman of the First Commission, House of Representatives of Indonesia. Japan, along with the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative Member States, continues to push towards the earliest entry into force of the Treaty. (2) Japan made a new voluntary contribution of $455,000 to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in early 2014. A part of these funds is for supporting the activities of the Group of Eminent Persons.
Action 14	The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization is to be encouraged to fully develop the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including early completion and provisional operationalization of the international monitoring system in accordance with the mandate of the Preparatory Commission, which should, upon entry into force of that Treaty, serve as an effective, reliable, participatory and non-discriminatory verification system with global reach, and provide assurance of compliance with that Treaty.	(1) Japan has been supporting the efforts and activities of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. As a recent concrete support, Japan made a voluntary contribution of approximately $740,000 to the Organization for a project to enhance the capability of the atmospheric transport modelling system in 2012. (2) In 2012, Japanese agencies and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization co-hosted three workshops in Japan; the Workshop on Noble Gas Monitoring co-hosted by the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, the International Hydroacoustics Workshop co-hosted by the Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology and the East Asia Regional National Data Center Workshop co-hosted by the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. (3) Japan has organized the Global Seismological Observation Training course every year since 1996. (4) Japan made a new voluntary contribution of $455,000 to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in early 2014. The larger part of the funds will be utilized in order to further enhance the verification system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

		Actions undertaken by Japan
E. Fissile materials		
Action 15	All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein. Also in this respect, the Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.	(1) Japan supports the programme of work of the Conference on Disarmament adopted in 2009 (CD/1864). Japan, as a member of the Conference on Disarmament, makes every effort to adopt a programme of work that includes negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. (2) At the high-level meeting on revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament in September 2010, then Foreign Minister Maehara stressed in his speech the importance of the revitalization of the Conference on Disarmament. (3) Japan and Australia co-hosted three sessions of experts side events on definitions and verification of a fissile material cut-off treaty on the margin of the Conference on Disarmament in the first half of 2011 (CD/1906, CD/1909, CD/1917). (4) A group of governmental experts on a fissile material cut-off treaty was established in accordance with General Assembly resolution 67/53. Japan, as a member of that group, will contribute to its work to make recommendations on possible aspects of a treaty.
Action 16	The nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to commit to declare, as appropriate, to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.	N/A
Action 17	In the context of action 16, all States are encouraged to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes.	(1) Japan and Australia co-hosted experts side events on verification of a fissile material cut-off treaty on the margin of the Conference on Disarmament in March and June 2011 (CD/1909, CD/1917), which may incorporate verification of excess material. (2) Japan actively participated in various meetings of Norway-United Kingdom projects on verification of nuclear disarmament.

		Actions undertaken by Japan
Action 18	All States that have not yet done so are encouraged to initiate a process towards the dismantling or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.	N/A
F. Other measures in support of nuclear disarmament		
Action 19	All States agree on the importance of supporting cooperation among Governments, the United Nations, other international and regional organizations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament.	(1) Japan and Australia co-hosted experts side events on a fissile material cut-off treaty on the margin of the Conference on Disarmament in March and June in 2011 (CD/1909, CD/1917), in which the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons actively participated. (2) Japan contributed funding for UNIDIR to conduct research on "transparency". (3) Since 1989, Japan has hosted the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues in different Japanese cities. Fruitful discussions were conducted among the participants and the Conference concluded with great success. (4) Japan held, jointly with the United Nations University, "the Global Forum on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education in the city of Nagasaki on 10 and 11 August in 2012. Throughout this forum, Japan contributed to the development of further efforts and promoted cooperation and a common understanding of the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education, with the participation of Governments, international organizations and civil society.
Action 20	States parties should submit regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, on the implementation of the present action plan, as well as of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.	This report is submitted in order to implement this action.

		Actions undertaken by Japan
Action 21	As a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is invited to establish a publicly accessible repository, which shall include the information provided by the nuclear-weapon States.	Japan, together with other Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative member countries, undertook to develop a draft standard nuclear disarmament reporting form as a contribution to discussions among the nuclear-weapon States. We shared the proposed reporting form with the five nuclear-weapon States in 2011.
Action 22	All States are encouraged to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/57/124) regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, in order to advance the goals of the Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.	(1) In 2010, Japan started a programme of appointing Hibakushas, atomic bomb survivors, as "Special Communicators for a world without nuclear weapons". The main purpose of this programme is to share with people around the world, especially the younger generations, the first-hand experiences of the Hibakusha. So far a total of 129 Special Communicators have been involved in different kinds of events worldwide. In order to pass knowledge from Hibakushas to younger generations, Japan launched a programme entitled "Youth Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons" in 2013. So far, a total of 25 Youth Communicators have sent strong messages on their determination to attain a world without nuclear weapons to the world on the occasion of international events. (2) In April 2014, on the margins of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative Ministerial Meeting in Hiroshima, the Youth Exchange Programme was held to share the experience of atomic bombings among the younger generations of Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative countries. (3) Japan held side events on education, in cooperation with the United Nations, during the United Nations Disarmament Week from 24 to 30 October in 2011 in the First Committee of the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly. The first event introduced two Special Communicators and announced the winners of the "Poetry for Peace" contest. The second event featured presentations by the two Special Communicators, who delivered their testimonies and engaged in discussions with the audience.

Actions undertaken by Japan

(4) Japan has also undertaken efforts to make testimonies of the Hibakusha more widely available. Testimonies have been translated into English and other languages and can be accessed on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

(5) Every year since 1983, Japan has hosted participants in the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme. Fellows visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki and learn about the realities of the terrible devastation caused by the atomic bombings.

(6) Since 1989, Japan has hosted the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues in different Japanese cities. Fruitful discussions were conducted among the participants and the Conference concluded with great success.

(7) In 2011, Japan established a new permanent disarmament exhibition entitled "Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons" at the United Nations Office at Geneva in cooperation with the United Nations. Photographs, texts and the artifacts of this exhibition will be instrumental in drawing attention to the importance of nuclear disarmament.

(8) The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative submitted a joint working paper entitled "Disarmament and non-proliferation education" to the first and second sessions of the Preparatory Committee. Japan and the Initiative called on all States parties to participate in the efforts on disarmament and non-proliferation education. Japan also submitted a joint working paper on education with Austria.

(9) Japan held, jointly with the United Nations University, the Global Forum on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education in the city of Nagasaki on 10 and 11 August 2012. Throughout this forum, Japan contributed to the development of further efforts and promoted cooperation and a common understanding of the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education, with the participation of Governments, international organizations and civil society.

(10) Japan sent a medical expert and atomic bomb survivors (Hibakushas) to the International Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in Oslo in March 2013 and in Nayarit, Mexico in February 2014. As the only country to have ever

		Actions undertaken by Japan
		suffered atomic bombings, they actively contributed to the discussions by making presentations from a scientific standpoint on the realities of the devastation caused by the use of nuclear weapons.
II. Nuclear non-proliferation		
Action 23	The Conference calls upon all States parties to exert all efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty, and not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.	Japan calls upon States that are not party to the Treaty to accede as a non-nuclear-weapon State on the occasion of bilateral meetings or international conferences.
Action 24	The Conference re-endorses the call by previous review conferences for the application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of article III of the Treaty.	Japan supports the universal application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards together with the additional protocol and has seized every opportunity to call upon countries that have not concluded them to do so.
Action 25	The Conference, noting that 18 States parties to the Treaty have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, urges them to do so as soon as possible and without further delay.	
Action 26	The Conference underscores the importance in complying with the non-proliferation obligations, addressing all compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty's integrity and the authority of the safeguards system.	Japan makes its full efforts so major non-compliance issues such as those of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic are addressed in related international forums, including the IAEA Board of Governors. In relation to the Iranian nuclear issue in particular, Japan is in close coordination with the international community in engaging in bilateral exchanges with the Islamic Republic of Iran so that it addresses the related concern.
Action 27	The Conference underscores the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in full conformity with the IAEA statute and the respective legal obligations of Member States. In this regard, the Conference calls upon Member States to extend their cooperation to the Agency.	Japan makes its full efforts so major non-compliance issues such as those of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic are addressed in related international forums, including the IAEA Board of Governors. In relation to the Iranian nuclear issue in particular, Japan is in close coordination with the international community in engaging in bilateral exchanges with the Islamic Republic of Iran so that it addresses the related concern.

		Actions undertaken by Japan
Action 28	The Conference encourages all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force.	N/A
Action 29	The Conference encourages IAEA to further facilitate and assist the States parties in the conclusion and entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The Conference calls on States parties to consider specific measures that would promote the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreements.	Japan supports the universal application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards together with the additional protocol and has seized every opportunity to call upon countries that have not concluded them to do so.
Action 30	The Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements, in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of IAEA resources, and stresses that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.	Japan submitted, together with other Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative member countries, a working paper on this issue to the second session of the Preparatory Committee.
Action 31	The Conference encourages all States parties with small quantities protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind them, as appropriate, as soon as possible.	N/A
Action 32	The Conference recommends that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented.	Japan has actively participated in discussions on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards. Japan has supported the resolutions in this regard at the IAEA General Conference.

		Actions undertaken by Japan
Action 33	The Conference calls upon all States parties to ensure that IAEA continues to have all political, technical and financial support so that it is able to effectively meet its responsibility to apply safeguards as required by article III of the Treaty.	
Action 34	The Conference encourages States parties, within the framework of the IAEA statute, to further develop a robust, flexible, adaptive and cost-effective international technology base for advanced safeguards through cooperation among Member States and with IAEA.	
Action 35	The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference.	In accordance with the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines Part 1, the Government of Japan authorizes the transfer and retransfer of items or related technology identified in the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines Part 1 only upon formal governmental assurances from recipients excluding uses that would result in any nuclear explosive device. In case of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials, software and related technology, the Government of Japan obtains, before authorizing the transfer, a statement from the end-user specifying the uses and end-use locations of the proposed transfers and an assurance explicitly stating that the proposed transfer or any replica thereof will not be used in any nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity, in accordance with the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines Part 2.
Action 36	The Conference encourages States parties to make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls.	The Government of Japan implements national export controls based on the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act and its relevant regulations, which are harmonized with the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines Part 1 and Part 2.
Action 37	The Conference encourages States parties to consider whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making nuclear export decisions.	The Government of Japan basically requests other States to conclude and bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol to apply this safeguards standard to the supply of nuclear material and equipment.

		Actions undertaken by Japan
Action 38	The Conference calls upon all States parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes.	Japan has been committed to technical cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Japan is the second largest contributor to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund. Japan also supports the Peaceful Uses Initiative and has made a significant contribution every year since 2011.
Action 39	States parties are encouraged to facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and materials and international cooperation among States parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, and to eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.	
Action 40	The Conference encourages all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities.	The Government of Japan is working on the incorporation of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 into the domestic laws and regulations. The Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was submitted to the Diet in February 2014. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was concluded in August 2007.
Action 41	The Conference encourages all States parties to apply, as appropriate, the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected)) and other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date.	INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) was almost incorporated into the domestic laws and regulations.
Action 42	The Conference calls on all States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ratify the amendment to the Convention as soon as possible and encourages them to act in accordance with the objectives and the purpose of the amendment until such time as it enters into force. The Conference also encourages all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and adopt the amendment as soon as possible.	The Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was submitted to the Diet in February 2014.

		Actions undertaken by Japan
Action 43	The Conference urges all States parties to implement the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2004.	Responding to the Code of Conduct and the Guidance, Japan developed the system to issue export certificates to export radioactive isotopes and the registration system of specific isotopes for radioactive sources with high-risk radiation impact on the human body.
Action 44	The Conference calls upon all States parties to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations, and calls upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in this regard. The Conference also calls upon States parties to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations.	(1) Japanese law enforcement authorities and customs are working on improvement of the national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. The Japan Atomic Energy Agency engages in research and development activities involving leading-edge technologies, including nuclear forensics and nuclear detection for strengthening nuclear security. Japan also contributes to the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database. (2) Since 1993, Japan has been holding the Asian Export Control Seminar annually in Tokyo to strengthen export controls and to deepen common recognition and understanding on export control issues among Asian countries and regions. In addition, Japan conducted industrial outreach seminars in the Asian region and training courses for export control officials in Japan. (3) Japan has established effective domestic controls based on the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act and its relevant regulations and has been enforcing them effectively in coordination with relevant ministries and agencies.
Action 45	The Conference encourages all States parties that have not yet done so to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.	The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was concluded in August 2007.
Action 46	The Conference encourages IAEA to continue to assist the States parties in strengthening their national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including the establishment and maintenance of the State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, as well as systems on regional level. The Conference calls upon IAEA Member States to broaden their support for the relevant IAEA programmes.	Japan has made financial contributions worth a total of more than $3 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund since its establishment in 2002. Japan recently decided to offer an additional €1.13 million. Japan will continue its support for IAEA.

		Actions undertaken by Japan
III. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy		
Action 47	Respect each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle policies.	N/A
Action 48	Undertake to facilitate, and reaffirm the right of States parties to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	N/A
Action 49	Cooperate with other States parties or international organizations in the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.	See actions 52 to 56
Action 50	Give preferential treatment to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.	Japan is committed to technical cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Japan is the second largest contributor to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund. Japan also supports the Peaceful Uses Initiative and has been making a significant contribution every year since 2011.
Action 51	Facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with articles I, II, III, and IV of the Treaty, and eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.	
Action 52	Continue efforts, within IAEA, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of its technical cooperation programme.	
Action 53	Strengthen the IAEA technical cooperation programme in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	

		Actions undertaken by Japan
Action 54	Make every effort and to take practical steps to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities are sufficient, assured and predictable.	
Action 55	Encourage all States in a position to do so to make additional contributions to the initiative designed to raise 100 million dollars over the next five years as extrabudgetary contributions to IAEA activities, while welcoming the contributions already pledged by countries and groups of countries in support of IAEA activities.	
Action 56	Encourage national, bilateral and international efforts to train the necessary skilled workforce needed to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	
Action 57	Ensure that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by commitments to and ongoing implementation of safeguards as well as appropriate and effective levels of safety and security, consistent with States' national legislation and respective international obligations.	Japan attaches great importance to the 3 S's (safety, security, safeguards) in using nuclear energy.
Action 58	Continue to discuss further, in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner under the auspices of IAEA or regional forums, the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibilities of creating mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply, as well as possible schemes dealing with the back-end of the fuel cycle without affecting rights under the Treaty and without prejudice to national fuel cycle policies, while tackling the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding these issues, including, in this regard, the requirement of IAEA full scope safeguards.	The negotiation between IAEA and the Government of Kazakhstan on creating the IAEA low-enriched uranium bank is still going on. The Government of Japan is following the situation of the negotiation.

		Actions undertaken by Japan
Action 59	Consider becoming party, if they have not yet done so, to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and to ratify its amendment so that it may enter into force at an early date.	(1) Japan is a contracting party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. Japan is encouraging other countries to become parties if they have not yet done so. (2) The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was concluded in August 2007. The Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was submitted to the Diet in February 2014.
Action 60	Promote the sharing of best practices in the area of nuclear safety and security, including through dialogue with the nuclear industry and the private sector, as appropriate.	Japan has hosted World Institute for Nuclear Security workshops several times. In November 2013, Japan hosted a table-top exercise for transport security with participants from France, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States, IAEA and some observer countries, in cooperation with the World Institute for Nuclear Security and the World Nuclear Transport Institute.
Action 61	Encourage States concerned, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize highly enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use, where technically and economically feasible.	Japan decided to remove all highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium from the Fast Critical Assembly at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency.
Action 62	Transport radioactive materials consistent with relevant international standards of safety, security and environmental protection, and to continue communication between shipping and coastal States for the purpose of confidence-building and addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.	In order to consider the development of best practice guidelines for Government-to-Government communication suggested at the IAEA conferences related to transport of radioactive materials held in October 2011 and March 2012, a working group was held repeatedly from December 2012 to August 2013 and Japan actively engaged in the discussions of the working group. Regarding the transport of radioactive materials, related ministries and operators have made efforts to ensure physical protection and safety and also have made efforts to implement the transport smoothly, delivering the Japanese position and efforts to coastal States through steady discussion and inviting concerned personnel, in order to improve their understanding of the transport.

		Actions undertaken by Japan
Action 63	Put in force a civil nuclear liability regime by becoming party to relevant international instruments or adopting suitable national legislation, based upon the principles established by the main pertinent international instruments.	In 2013, the Government of Japan expressed its intention to work on concluding the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage.
Action 64	The Conference calls upon all States to abide by the decision adopted by consensus at the IAEA General Conference on 18 September 2009 on prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction.	N/A

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Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Report on the activities of Australia in support of the implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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I. Nuclear disarmament

A. Principles and objectives: *The Conference resolves that:*

Action 1	All States parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.	Australia's commitment to the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons remains undiminished. We hold ourselves to the highest standards of compliance with our non-proliferation obligations. Australia continues to be a prominent and active advocate of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Initiatives we have promoted include a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests (the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which Australia ratified in July 1998) and negotiations on a treaty to cap the production of fissile materials. Australia is also, along with Japan, a founding member of the 12-nation Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative. The key objective of the Initiative is specifically to take forward the 64-point action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was agreed by consensus and includes most of the steps required to advance the disarmament and non-proliferation objectives encapsulated by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Australia actively supported and participated as a Friend of the Chair, contributed a joint building block paper and moderated several sessions in the open-ended working group process in 2013 to advance nuclear disarmament negotiations, as established by General Assembly resolution 67/56 of 3 December 2012. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative has submitted a number of working papers during the 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle calling for concrete steps towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. Our

		"Nuclear Disarmament Post-New START" working paper for the 2014 Preparatory Committee welcomed the ongoing implementation of New START but called for a further round of cuts and called upon all nuclear-weapon States and other States possessing nuclear weapons to take further steps to reduce their arsenals. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative also submitted a paper in 2014 calling on the nuclear-weapon States to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems, pursuant to actions 5 (e) and 5 (f) of the 2010 action plan ("De-alerting" working paper). At the 2013 Preparatory Committee, the Initiative submitted papers urging the inclusion of non-strategic nuclear weapons in any future nuclear disarmament process and calling on nuclear-weapon States to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national security policies ("Reduced role of nuclear weapons" working paper). Australia's concerns about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use has underpinned our actions in seeking practical and achievable ways to move towards a world without nuclear weapons. Australia, along with 17 other States, issued a statement at the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, underlining that the issue of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons use is an integral part of the global disarmament and non-proliferation process.
Action 2	All States parties commit to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations.	Australia reaffirms its commitment to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of its Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations. Australia's support for, inter alia, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the fissile material cut-off treaty, the

		International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, nuclear-weapon-free zones and transparency through reporting is consistent with that commitment. Australia, along with the other 11 members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, also submitted a working paper on increased transparency in nuclear disarmament, stressing that the principle of transparency underpinned the principles of verifiability and irreversibility and that increased transparency went to the core of strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process. The working paper called upon nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form and to use it to meet reporting commitments. Greater transparency is also essential for building the trust and confidence necessary to underpin disarmament.
B. Disarmament of nuclear weapons: *The Conference resolves that:*		
Action 3	In implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States commit to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.	N/A
Action 4	The Russian Federation and the United States of America commit to seek the early entry into force and full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and are encouraged to continue discussions on follow-on measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals.	N/A

Action 5	The nuclear-weapon States commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security. To that end, they are called upon to promptly engage with a view to, inter alia: (a) Rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons, as identified in action 3; (b) Address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process; (c) To further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (d) Discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons; (e) Consider the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security; (f) Reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and (g) Further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence.	N/A
Action 6	All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.	As a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Australia supports the establishment of a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work. Australia has consistently called for the adoption by the Conference on Disarmament of a programme of work that would provide for the implementation of this action: Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Julie Bishop, in a speech to the Conference on Disarmament on

		26 March 2014, called on all members to unblock the Conference on Disarmament and agree on a programme of work. Australia worked actively and constructively as vice-co-chair of the Informal Working Group, through the offices of Ambassador Woolcott, with the mandate to "adopt and implement a programme of work" in the 2013 session of the Conference on Disarmament. This mandate was renewed in 2014 and the Informal Working Group is continuing to proactively obtain a breakthrough at the earliest possible date in the 2014 session on a consensus on a Conference programme of work.

C. Security assurances: *Without prejudice to efforts with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Conference resolves that:*

Action 7	All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument. The Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.	As a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Australia supports the discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work. Australia has consistently called for the adoption by the Conference on Disarmament of a programme of work which would provide for the implementation of this action. Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs attended the high-level meeting in New York on 24 September 2010 and registered Australia's strong concern about the continuing failure of the Conference to resume substantive work. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Julie Bishop, repeated this call in an address to the Conference on 26 March 2014. Australia is working actively and constructively as vice-co-chair of the Informal Working Group with the mandate to "adopt and implement a

		programme of work at the earliest possible date in the 2014 session" to find consensus on a Conference on Disarmament programme of work. We, as part of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, produced a working paper on nuclear-weapon-free zones and negative security assurances for the 2013 Preparatory Committee underlining the legitimate interest that non-nuclear-weapon States have in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances.
Action 8	All nuclear-weapon States commit to fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances. Those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so are encouraged to extend security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.	N/A
Action 9	The establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where appropriate, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, is encouraged. All concerned States are encouraged to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their relevant protocols, and to constructively consult and cooperate to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of all such nuclear-weapon-free zones treaties, which include negative security assurances. The concerned States are encouraged to review any related reservations.	Australia is a strong supporter of nuclear-weapon-free zones freely arrived at by Member States. Australia was an early champion of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and ratified the Treaty on 11 December 1986. Australia advocates for all countries of the region to join the Treaty and continues to encourage the United States of America to ratify the Treaty's protocols without reservation. Australia supports dialogue between Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members and the nuclear-weapon States on the signature by the nuclear-weapon States of the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Australia also encourages all members of the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone and the nuclear-weapon States to continue to work together to resolve their

differences and enable signature of the protocols to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia.

Australia co-sponsors the annual General Assembly resolution (most recently 68/25) on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty).

Australia continues to support the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, freely arrived at by regional States. The Australian Government supports constructive efforts towards the convening of a conference to discuss such a zone.

We, as part of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted a working paper on nuclear-weapon-free zones and negative security assurances to the 2013 Preparatory Committee, and a working paper on establishing a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East to the 2014 Preparatory Committee, underlining that nuclear-weapon-free zones are an important means for enhancing global and regional peace and security.

D. Nuclear testing: *The Conference resolves that:*

Action 10	All nuclear-weapon States undertake to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty with all expediency, noting that positive decisions by nuclear-weapon States would have the beneficial impact towards the ratification of that Treaty, and that nuclear-weapon States have the special responsibility to encourage Annex 2 countries, in particular those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify.	Australia was one of the earliest countries to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, doing so in July 1998, and actively promotes further ratifications of the Treaty, particularly by Annex 2 States, to allow its entry into force.

Action 11	Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, all States commit to refrain from nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, the use of new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of that Treaty, and all existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions should be maintained.	Australia has enacted national legislation (the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Act 1998 (the CTBT Act) and the Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Act 2003) implementing the obligations of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in preparation for its entry into force. Through this legislation, a ban on nuclear testing is in force.
Action 12	All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty recognize the contribution of the conferences on facilitating the entry into force of that Treaty and of the measures adopted by consensus at the Sixth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in September 2009, and commit to report at the 2011 Conference on progress made towards the urgent entry into force of that Treaty.	Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs outlined Australia's activities in pursuit of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty during the 2011 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Article XIV Conference in New York on 23 September 2011.
Action 13	All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty undertake to promote the entry into force and implementation of that Treaty at the national, regional and global levels.	Australia, as co-chair of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty group, which convenes a high-level meeting biannually during General Assembly Leaders' Week, consistently urges States that have yet to do so to sign and/or ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs chaired the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty meeting in New York on 27 September 2012. Australia welcomed the most recent ratifications of the Treaty: Guinea-Bissau and Iraq in September 2013 and Niue in March 2014. With Mexico and New Zealand, Australia is lead sponsor of the annual General Assembly resolution (most recently 68/68), which stresses the fundamental importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and urges its earliest entry into force.

		Australia's Ambassador for Disarmament reiterated, at the eighth Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Article XIV Conference in September 2013, the importance of maintaining international momentum towards entry into force of the Treaty. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd is a member of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Group of Eminent Persons, which is focused on entry into force and pressing remaining States to ratify the Treaty, particularly Annex 2 States. Australia, with other members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative and Vienna Group of Ten, presented working papers on this issue to the 2013 Preparatory Committee. Australia, through the Vienna Group of Ten, presented a working paper on addressing "Vienna issues" to the 2014 Preparatory Committee, which covers, inter alia, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty issues.
Action 14	The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization is to be encouraged to fully develop the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including early completion and provisional operationalization of the international monitoring system in accordance with the mandate of the Preparatory Commission, which should, upon entry into force of that Treaty, serve as an effective, reliable, participatory and non-discriminatory verification system with global reach, and provide assurance of compliance with that Treaty.	Australia hosts the third largest number of monitoring stations (21) in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty International Monitoring System. Australia also actively supports the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in developing other aspects of its verification regime, including a leading role in developing on-site inspection procedures.

Australia works with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, through technical workshops and other outreach measures, to promote development of and cooperation between national data centres.

Australia consistently calls on all States to provide strong financial, technical and political support to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization for its work on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification regime.

E. Fissile materials: *The Conference resolves that:*

Action 15 All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein. Also in this respect, the Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

Australia is a strong proponent for the commencement of negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, commonly known as the fissile material cut-off treaty.

Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs attended the high-level meeting in New York on 24 September 2010 and registered Australia's strong concern about the continuing failure of the Conference on Disarmament to resume substantive work.

In 2011, Australia and Japan co-hosted, and in 2012 Australia participated in, a series of experts side events in Geneva to discuss technical aspects of such a treaty and to help build confidence and momentum for a start to negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament.

Australia has consistently called for the adoption by the Conference on Disarmament of a programme of work which would provide for the implementation of this action, most recently during an address to the Conference on Disarmament on 26 March 2014 by Minister for Foreign Affairs, Julie Bishop.

		Australia supported General Assembly resolution 67/53 and General Assembly decision 68/518, which called on the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and, in the interim, for a group of governmental experts to make recommendations on aspects of such a ban. Australia actively participated in the first group of governmental experts in Geneva in April and May 2014.
Action 16	The nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to commit to declare, as appropriate, to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.	N/A
Action 17	In the context of action 16, all States are encouraged to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes.	Australia affirms its readiness to contribute to the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes.
Action 18	All States that have not yet done so are encouraged to initiate a process towards the dismantling or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.	Australia has never had facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
F. Other measures in support of nuclear disarmament: *The Conference resolves that:*		
Action 19	All States agree on the importance of supporting cooperation among Governments, the United Nations, other international and regional organizations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament.	Australia is committed to supporting cooperation among Governments, the United Nations, other international and regional organizations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear

		disarmament. This report is consistent with that commitment and outlines Australia's efforts in this regard. We, as part of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, presented a working paper on increased transparency in nuclear disarmament to the 2014 Preparatory Committee, underlining the importance of nuclear-weapon States agreeing on a standard reporting form to meet their disarmament reporting obligations.
Action 20	States parties should submit regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, on the implementation of the present action plan, as well as of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996. (This field can be used for reporting on implementation of relevant decisions agreed prior to 2010.)	In addition to the 2010 action plan, this report takes in Australia's reporting on the implementation of article VI, paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. Australia's previous report on the implementation of article VI, paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" is contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/36 of 7 May 2010. The present report updates our 2012 written report and the 2013 verbal update on Australian's activities in support of the 2010 action plan. The Australian National University's Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, which has received financial support from the Australian Government, produced the report *Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play* on the implementation of, inter alia, the 2010 Review Conference action plan.

Action 21	As a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is invited to establish a publicly accessible repository, which shall include the information provided by the nuclear-weapon States.	With other countries in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Australia has jointly developed a draft nuclear disarmament reporting form. The Initiative has shared the draft form with the nuclear-weapon States, as a contribution to their discussions on disarmament transparency and implementation of this action. The Initiative presented a working paper on this issue to the 2012 Preparatory Committee. The Initiative further submitted a working paper to the 2014 Preparatory Committee on increased transparency, calling on nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form and to use it to implement action 20 and action 5.
Action 22	All States are encouraged to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/57/124) regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, in order to advance the goals of the Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.	Australia welcomes the recommendations in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/57/124) regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, in September 2011, announced that it would actively promote disarmament and non-proliferation education to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. The Initiative produced separate working papers on this issue for the 2012 and 2013 Preparatory Committees. Australia joined Japan, along with 30 other countries, as a co-sponsor for a statement on disarmament and non-proliferation education delivered to the 2013 Preparatory Committee. We are again supporting Japan's initiative in 2014.

II. Nuclear non-proliferation

Action 23	The Conference calls upon all States parties to exert all efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty, and not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.	Australia actively promotes universal adherence to the Treaty and its principles. In bilateral exchanges and statements in multilateral forums, Australia has consistently called for all Non-Proliferation Treaty States to

		join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and without preconditions. Australia has also conducted regional outreach activities promoting adherence to and fulfilment of Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments, including through hosting capacity-building courses and workshops in Australia. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative submitted a working paper on addressing withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the 2014 Preparatory Committee.
Action 24	The Conference re-endorses the call by previous review conferences for the application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of article III of the Treaty.	Australia actively supports the application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards, together with the IAEA additional protocol, to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities. Australia was the first country to sign and ratify the additional protocol (entry into force on 12 December 1997), the first to make it a condition of supply for uranium exports and the first for which IAEA was able to declare that all nuclear materials and activities of safeguards relevance had been appropriately declared and accounted for. Australia continues to work to promote universalization of and adherence to comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols for all Non-Proliferation Treaty non-nuclear-weapon States.
Action 25	The Conference, noting that 18 States parties to the Treaty have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, urges them to do so as soon as possible and without further delay.	Australia encourages all States that have not yet done so to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA, together with an additional protocol. Australia has facilitated discussions, provided expert advice and hosted study tours that assist States to bring into force these agreements.

Action 26	The Conference underscores the importance in complying with the non-proliferation obligations, addressing all compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty's integrity and the authority of the safeguards system.	Australia holds itself to the highest standards of compliance with its non-proliferation commitments and obligations, and cooperates fully with IAEA. Australia consistently and strongly promotes universal compliance by States with their non-proliferation obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and under their agreements with IAEA. Australia, through the Vienna Group of Ten, presented a working paper on compliance and verification to the 2013 Preparatory Committee. Australia, through the Vienna Group of Ten, presented a working paper on "Vienna issues" to the 2014 Preparatory Committee, which covers, inter alia, compliance and verification issues. See also responses to action 29.
Action 27	The Conference underscores the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in full conformity with the IAEA statute and the respective legal obligations of Member States. In this regard, the Conference calls upon Member States to extend their cooperation to the Agency.	Australia holds itself to the highest standards of compliance with its non-proliferation commitments and obligations and cooperates fully with IAEA. Australia consistently calls on all States to cooperate fully with IAEA and to comply with their international safeguards obligations. Australia does this in bilateral, regional and multilateral forums, including the IAEA Board of Governors. Australia provided an extrabudgetary contribution for IAEA to carry out verification activities in support of the P5+1/Islamic Republic of Iran Joint Plan of Action.
Action 28	The Conference encourages all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force.	Australia signed the additional protocol on 23 September 1997, with entry into force on 12 December 1997.

		Australia actively encourages all States that have not yet done so to bring into force an additional protocol to their safeguards agreements with IAEA. See also response to action 23.
Action 29	The Conference encourages IAEA to further facilitate and assist the States parties in the conclusion and entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The Conference calls on States parties to consider specific measures that would promote the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreements.	Australia currently chairs the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network, an informal network of safeguards authorities, ministries and other organizations responsible for implementing safeguards in the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. The objective of the Network is to promote safeguards best practice in the region. This is being achieved through enhanced cooperation in areas such as training, professional development and the sharing of experiences. The Director-General of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office chairs the IAEA Director-General's Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation. Australia has also provided instructors for safeguards courses run by IAEA and other partners in the Asia-Pacific region. Australia continues to engage with and support South-East Asian and Pacific Islands States on safeguards issues, particularly those States that have yet to conclude and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, additional protocols and small quantities protocols with IAEA. Australia has offered assistance to some States in the development of their safeguards agreements and arrangements with IAEA.

18/33 Action 30	The Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements, in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of IAEA resources, and stresses that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.	The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative presented a working paper on the wider application of safeguards in the nuclear-weapon States to the 2013 Preparatory Committee.
Action 31	The Conference encourages all States parties with small quantities protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind them, as appropriate, as soon as possible.	Australia has never had a small quantities protocol. Australia consistently encourages all Non-Proliferation Treaty States parties with older small quantities protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind them, as appropriate, as soon as possible. Australia, including as part of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, conducts outreach to States, where appropriate, to amend or rescind small quantities protocols.
Action 32	The Conference recommends that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented.	Australia affirms its support for these recommendations. As a Board of Governors member, Australia supports the Director-General's and Board's efforts to continually strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards, including through the use of the State-level concept. See also response to action 29.
Action 33	The Conference calls upon all States parties to ensure that IAEA continues to have all political, technical and financial support so that it is able to effectively meet its responsibility to apply safeguards as required by article III of the Treaty.	Australia always pays its assessed contribution and provides additional extrabudgetary contributions and in-kind support. Australia is a strong proponent of IAEA carrying out its functions with the full cooperation of all States. One of the key elements of Australia's support to IAEA is its active participation on the IAEA Board of Governors and participation in the IAEA Member State support programme since 1980.

		Australia provided an extrabudgetary contribution for IAEA to carry out verification activities in support of the P5+1/Islamic Republic of Iran Joint Plan of Action.
Action 34	The Conference encourages States parties, within the framework of the IAEA statute, to further develop a robust, flexible, adaptive and cost-effective international technology base for advanced safeguards through cooperation among Member States and with IAEA.	Australia maintains a strong technology base and technical capabilities, which it makes available to contribute to international safeguards efforts. It also maintains an IAEA Member State support programme to support the Agency's technical safeguards capabilities. Australia hosts two diagnostic labs as part of the IAEA network of analytical laboratories.
Action 35	The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference.	Australia's uranium is exported for exclusively peaceful purposes and only to countries and parties with which Australia has a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement. Australia's bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements include treaty-level assurances that Australian nuclear material will be used for peaceful purposes only and that this material will be subject to IAEA safeguards. These agreements ensure that Australia's nuclear exports remain in exclusively peaceful use and may only be retransferred to a party with a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with Australia. Australia currently has 23 such bilateral agreements in force covering 41 countries plus Taiwan. In the case of non-nuclear-weapon States parties, IAEA safeguards must apply to all existing and future nuclear activities.

Australia has ratified the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which is implemented via the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 and the Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Act 2007, and is implementing Revision 5 of IAEA INFCIRC/225 (Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities).

Action 36 The Conference encourages States parties to make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls.

Australia ensures that nuclear-related exports do not assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Australia's export controls are based on multilateral best practice. In addition, Australian nuclear agencies cooperate closely with law enforcement and customs agencies to enhance Australia's capability to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.

Australia is a member of both the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee.

The Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations of the Customs Act 1901 states that any item on Australia's control list, the Defence and Strategic Goods List, requires authorization prior to export. The Defence and Strategic Goods List incorporates the Nuclear Suppliers Group control list (parts I and II), the Zangger Committee trigger list and annexes 1 and 2 to the IAEA additional protocol.

The Australian Government has also enacted the Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act 1995. The Act and the associated Regulations enable the Government to control the export or transfer of any goods and services that may assist a weapons of mass destruction programme and which are not controlled under other legislation.

See also response to action 35.

		Australia contributed to two working papers on export controls submitted to the 2013 Preparatory Committee by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative and the Vienna Group of Ten respectively. Australia, through the Vienna Group of Ten, presented a working paper on addressing "Vienna issues" to the 2014 Preparatory Committee which covers, inter alia, export control issues.
Action 37	The Conference encourages States parties to consider whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making nuclear export decisions.	See response to action 35.
Action 38	The Conference calls upon all States parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes.	Australia has consistently affirmed its support for the development of nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes, within a framework that reduces proliferation risk and adheres to the highest international standards for safeguards, security and safety.
Action 39	States parties are encouraged to facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and materials and international cooperation among States parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, and to eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.	Australia facilitates the transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties through arrangements such as the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific; the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia; the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme; the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative and other IAEA programmes. See responses to actions 35, 36 and 38.

22/33	Action 40	The Conference encourages all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities.

Australia maintains the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, as was recognized by Australia's number 1 ranking for security of its nuclear materials by the 2012 and 2014 Nuclear Threat Initiative nuclear materials security indexes.

Australia is an active participant in the series of Nuclear Security Summits focused on implementing measures to improve the global nuclear security regimes, particularly against international terrorism. Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Julie Bishop, attended the most recent Nuclear Security Summit, held in the Netherlands in March 2014.

In November 2013, Australia hosted an IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission. Australia has also provided experts to a number of other Advisory Service missions.

The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation participates in the IAEA Advisory Group on Nuclear Security advising the IAEA Director-General on activities related to preventing, detecting and responding to nuclear and radiological terrorism.

At the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague in March 2014, Australia announced a contribution of A$1 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund to support IAEA activities in the Indo-Pacific region, including assisting regional partners to establish effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes, strengthening nuclear security cooperation through regional and bilateral programmes and assisting States to adhere to relevant international nuclear security agreements.

		Australia has hosted a number of table-top exercises in support of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, most recently in February 2014. Australia also chairs the Nuclear Forensics Working Group of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Australia, through the Vienna Group of Ten, presented a working paper on nuclear security to the 2013 Preparatory Committee, and a working paper on addressing "Vienna issues" to the 2014 Preparatory Committee, which covers, inter alia, nuclear security. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative has presented a working paper on nuclear security to the 2014 Preparatory Committee. See also response to action 35.
Action 41	The Conference encourages all States parties to apply, as appropriate, the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected)) and other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date.	At The Hague Nuclear Security Summit, Australia committed to realize or exceed the objectives of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 as part of the joint statements on strengthening nuclear security implementation. See also response to action 35.
Action 42	The Conference calls on all States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ratify the amendment to the Convention as soon as possible and encourages them to act in accordance with the objectives and the purpose of the amendment until such time as it enters into force. The Conference also encourages all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and adopt the amendment as soon as possible.	Australia ratified the amendment on 17 July 2008. See also response to action 35.

Action 43	The Conference urges all States parties to implement the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2004.	Australia has implemented the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2004.
Action 44	The Conference calls upon all States parties to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations, and calls upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in this regard. The Conference also calls upon States parties to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations.	See response to action 36. Australia supports and contributes as necessary to the Incident and Trafficking Database.
Action 45	The Conference encourages all States parties that have not yet done so to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.	Australia deposited its instrument of ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism on 16 March 2012. (National legislation: Nuclear Terrorism Legislation Amendment Act 2012.) Australia has implemented its requirements under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and plays an active role in the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Also, Australia has taken every opportunity in its outreach on non-proliferation to inform Asia-Pacific countries of the goals and obligations of resolution 1540 (2004) and to offer to work with them to further improve and strengthen their capacity to implement the resolution where possible.

Action 46	The Conference encourages IAEA to continue to assist the States parties in strengthening their national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including the establishment and maintenance of the State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, as well as systems on regional level. The Conference calls upon IAEA Member States to broaden their support for the relevant IAEA programmes.	Australia, as an IAEA Board of Governors member, affirms its support for this recommendation. Australia further broadens its support for IAEA programmes through participation in the IAEA Member State support programme. Australia, through mechanisms such as the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific, the Regional Security of Radioactive Sources Project and the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network, has assisted regional countries in strengthening their national regulatory controls of nuclear and radiological materials.

III. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy: *The Conference calls upon States parties to act in conformity with all the provisions of the Treaty and to:*

Action 47	Respect each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle policies.	Australia respects each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and engages in extensive cooperation with other States parties and international organizations in the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses. See also response to actions 35 and 38.
Action 48	Undertake to facilitate, and reaffirm the right of States parties to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	See response to action 38. Australia has shared its experience with neighbouring countries in the safe application of nuclear science and technology through arrangements such as the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific, the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia, the Regional Security of Radioactive Sources Project, the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative and other IAEA programmes.

Action 49	Cooperate with other States parties or international organizations in the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.	The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation participates in the IAEA Standing Advisory Group on Nuclear Applications, providing high-level input on priorities for the IAEA research programmes in nuclear technology. See response to action 48.
Action 50	Give preferential treatment to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.	See response to action 48.
Action 51	Facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with articles I, II, III, and IV of the Treaty, and eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.	See responses to actions 35, 36 and 38.
Action 52	Continue efforts, within IAEA, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of its technical cooperation programme.	Australia is a long-standing contributor to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund. In 2011, Australia provided A$100,000 in an extrabudgetary Peaceful Uses Initiative contribution to IAEA for a study on marine impacts of radiation from the Fukushima Power Plant and, in 2012, contributed A$15,000 to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative to study ocean acidification. In 2014, Australia also contributed €20,000 to the IAEA Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy. Australia's policy has been to pay its annual Technical Cooperation Fund contribution in full and on time and to encourage other States to do the same.

		In addition to the Technical Cooperation Fund, Australia plays a key role in cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the Asia-Pacific region. Australia's nuclear-related agencies, the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office continue to provide experts to IAEA and to hold a range of meetings with regional counterparts, as part of bilateral cooperation agreements and IAEA projects. Australia, through the Vienna Group of Ten, presented working papers on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to the 2013 Preparatory Committee; and on addressing "Vienna issues" to the 2014 Preparatory Committee, which covers, inter alia, cooperation on peaceful uses.
Action 53	Strengthen the IAEA technical cooperation programme in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	See response to action 52.
Action 54	Make every effort and to take practical steps to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities are sufficient, assured and predictable.	See response to action 52.
Action 55	Encourage all States in a position to do so to make additional contributions to the initiative designed to raise 100 million dollars over the next five years as extrabudgetary contributions to IAEA activities, while welcoming the contributions already pledged by countries and groups of countries in support of IAEA activities.	In 2011, Australia contributed A$100,000 to IAEA for a study on marine impacts of radiation from the Fukushima Power Plant. The study is administered by IAEA and conducted under the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific, a treaty-level agreement to which Australia is a party. In 2012, Australia contributed A$15,000 to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative to study ocean acidification.

		In 2014, Australia also contributed €20,000 to the IAEA Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy.
Action 56	Encourage national, bilateral and international efforts to train the necessary skilled workforce needed to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	See response to action 48. Australia, in cooperation with IAEA, provided training for international participants on a range of topics related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including specialized areas such as radiological crime scene evaluation, reactor decommissioning and the regulation of uranium mining.
Action 57	Ensure that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by commitments to and ongoing implementation of safeguards as well as appropriate and effective levels of safety and security, consistent with States' national legislation and respective international obligations.	See responses to actions 38 and 40.
Action 58	Continue to discuss further, in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner under the auspices of IAEA or regional forums, the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibilities of creating mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply, as well as possible schemes dealing with the back-end of the fuel cycle without affecting rights under the Treaty and without prejudice to national fuel cycle policies, while tackling the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding these issues, including, in this regard, the requirement of IAEA full scope safeguards.	Australia recognizes the potential for proposals relating to multilateral fuel assurance mechanisms and multilateralization of the fuel cycle to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. Through its position on the IAEA Board of Governors, Australia has supported IAEA-managed multilateral fuel cycle projects and proposals. Australia supports further discussion of this issue in appropriate international forums.

Action 59	Consider becoming party, if they have not yet done so, to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and to ratify its amendment so that it may enter into force at an early date.	Australia is a party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (and has ratified its amendment). See also response to action 45.
Action 60	Promote the sharing of best practices in the area of nuclear safety and security, including through dialogue with the nuclear industry and the private sector, as appropriate.	See response to action 48. Australia supports and promotes the actions in the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, which takes forward lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident. In the margins of the IAEA General Conference, Australia hosts a Friends of Responsible Uranium Mining activity with industry involvement that provides a forum to share best practices in uranium mining. The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation played a leading role in the 2014 Nuclear Industry Summit, which brought together leaders of the nuclear industry to strengthen efforts in areas including cybersecurity and reducing the use of highly enriched uranium in the civilian sector. Australia, through the Vienna Group of Ten, presented working papers on nuclear safety to the 2012 and 2013 Preparatory Committees, and a working paper on addressing "Vienna issues" to the 2014 Preparatory Committee, which covers, inter alia, nuclear safety issues.

Action 61	Encourage States concerned, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize highly enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use, where technically and economically feasible.	Australia has minimized its possession and use of highly enriched uranium through the exclusive use of low-enriched uranium for its nuclear research reactor fuel and targets in the manufacture of medical radioisotopes. Australia's success in that regard has demonstrated that there is no technical reason for the use of highly enriched uranium in radioisotope production. Australia has also reduced its remaining stocks of highly enriched uranium. Australia is sharing its experiences in the use of low-enriched uranium in research reactors and radioisotope production, both bilaterally and by participating in IAEA and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Nuclear Energy Agency initiatives.
Action 62	Transport radioactive materials consistent with relevant international standards of safety, security and environmental protection, and to continue communication between shipping and coastal States for the purpose of confidence-building and addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.	Australia works to meet the highest standards of safety, security and environmental protection in the transport of radioactive materials through its stringent regulation of nuclear activities, including uranium mining, which takes into consideration all IAEA requirements and recommendations.
Action 63	Put in force a civil nuclear liability regime by becoming party to relevant international instruments or adopting suitable national legislation, based upon the principles established by the main pertinent international instruments.	Australia works to meet the highest standards of safety, security and environmental protection in the transport of radioactive materials. Australia supports the principles enshrined in the nuclear liability conventions adopted in 1997 and 2004: the 1997 Vienna Convention; the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage; and the 2004 Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention. Australia has signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage.

		At the invitation of the Director-General of IAEA, Australia chairs the IAEA International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability.
Action 64	The Conference calls upon all States to abide by the decision adopted by consensus at the IAEA General Conference on 18 September 2009 on prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction.	Australia abides by the decision adopted by consensus at the IAEA General Conference on 18 September 2009 on prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction.

IV. The Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

	1. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalls the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Conference stresses that the resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved. The resolution, which was co-sponsored by the depositary States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America), is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. States parties renew their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation.	Australia continues to support the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, freely arrived at by regional States. The Australian Government welcomed the outcome of the 2010 Review Conference on the 1995 Middle East resolution and will support constructive efforts to progress the implementation of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
	2. The Conference reaffirms its endorsement of the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process, and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction.	Australia affirms its readiness to support efforts towards convening a Conference on the establishment of such a zone and calls on all relevant States to achieve a constructive outcome to these processes.
	3. The Conference takes note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.	Universal membership of and adherence to existing treaties and instruments would greatly facilitate the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Australia is contributing to this objective through its efforts to achieve universal membership of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention and its active support for the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.
	4. The Conference regrets that little progress has been achieved towards the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.	
	5. The Conference recalls the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA	

safeguards. The Conference reaffirms the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty. The Conference calls on all States in the Middle East that have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date.

6. The Conference stresses the necessity of strict adherence by all States parties to their obligations and commitments under the Treaty. The Conference urges all States in the region to take relevant steps and confidence-building measures to contribute to the realization of the objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and calls upon all States to refrain from undertaking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective.

7. The Conference emphasizes the importance of a process leading to full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. To that end, the Conference endorses the following practical steps:

(a) The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, will convene a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States. The 2012 Conference shall take as its terms of reference the 1995 Resolution;

(b) Appointment by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, of a facilitator, with a mandate to support implementation of the 1995 Resolution by conducting consultations with the States of the region in that regard and undertaking preparations for the convening of the 2012 Conference. The facilitator will also assist in implementation of follow-on steps agreed by the participating regional States at the 2012 Conference. The facilitator will report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings;

(c) Designation by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, of a host Government for the 2012 Conference;

(d) Additional steps aimed at supporting the implementation of the 1995 Resolution, including that IAEA, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and other relevant international

The additional protocol on strengthened IAEA safeguards offers Middle East States an important confidence-building opportunity. Australia encourages the adoption by all States of an additional protocol with IAEA, without delay or preconditions. Stronger safeguards are in the interests of all countries when they can prevent the emergence of more nuclear-weapons-capable States.

Australia acknowledges the difficulty of achieving disarmament and non-proliferation goals without concurrent efforts to address the underlying political tensions that drive international conflicts. It urges all States parties to work to secure a regional political environment that is conducive to disarmament, non-proliferation and the creation of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative has presented a working paper on this issue to the 2014 Preparatory Committee.

organizations be requested to prepare background documentation for the 2012 Conference regarding modalities for a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, taking into account work previously undertaken and experience gained;

(e) Consideration of all offers aimed at supporting the implementation of the 1995 Resolution, including the offer of the European Union to host a follow-on seminar to that organized in June 2008.

8. The Conference emphasizes the requirement of maintaining parallel progress, in substance and timing, in the process leading to achieving total and complete elimination of all weapons of mass destruction in the region, nuclear, chemical and biological.

9. The Conference reaffirms that all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and the States in the region, should continue to report on steps taken to implement the 1995 Resolution, through the United Nations Secretariat, to the President of the 2015 Review Conference, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference.

10. The Conference further recognizes the important role played by civil society in contributing to the implementation of the 1995 Resolution and encourages all efforts in this regard.

Other regional issue

The Conference strongly urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fulfil the commitments under the Six-Party Talks, including the complete and verifiable abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in accordance with the September 2005 joint statement, and urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return, at an early date, to the Treaty and to its adherence with its IAEA safeguards agreement. The Conference also calls on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and all States parties to fully implement all relevant nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. The Conference reaffirms its firm support for the Six-Party Talks and remains determined to achieve the satisfactory and comprehensive resolution to the issues involved through diplomatic means.

Australia strongly urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fulfil the commitments under the Six-Party Talks, including the complete and verifiable abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in accordance with the September 2005 joint statement, and urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return, at the earliest date, to the Treaty and to its adherence to its IAEA safeguards agreement.

Australia fully implements all relevant nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament obligations, including relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.

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Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Switzerland

Introduction

1. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and an essential element of international security. All States parties share a collective responsibility to maintain the Treaty's credibility by achieving its goals.

2. Switzerland is of the view that the 64 actions contained in the action plan and the practical steps for the Middle East adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, together with the Final Documents of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, represent the Treaty's acquis, which is to be transformed into concrete results. Accelerating progress in the implementation of the action plan is crucial for a positive outcome in 2015 and for the credibility of the Treaty.

3. Switzerland strongly believes that obligations and commitments under all the three pillars are inextricably linked, which is why unfulfilled commitments under any of the pillars could have a negative impact on the other pillars. Switzerland is of the view that, while much has been achieved with regard to non-proliferation and peaceful use, efforts regarding nuclear disarmament need to be accelerated significantly in the interests of the credibility and sustainability of the Treaty. Switzerland is also convinced that continued possession of nuclear weapons by some States, and the continued attribution of "value" to nuclear weapons as a tool for enhancing security, may increase the risk of nuclear proliferation.

4. Switzerland has been supporting Reaching Critical Will, the disarmament programme of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, in its efforts to monitor the implementation of the action plan. The findings of the 2014 report were presented in Geneva in March 2014, ahead of the third session of the Preparatory Committee. The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies,

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which is also supported by Switzerland, also presented findings regarding progress and lack thereof in the disarmament-related actions of the action plan.

5. Step 12 of the 13 practical steps agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference calls for regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament". This call was reiterated in action 20 of the action plan. In line with this commitment, and with a view to contributing to transparency and building confidence towards the 2015 Review Conference, Switzerland submits the present report, an update of its report in 2013 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/3).

Pillar 1 (actions 1 to 23 of the action plan)

6. Switzerland has again recognized the efforts made by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals. However, in support of the implementation of actions 3, 4 and 5 of the action plan, Switzerland has again expressed its concern that several thousand nuclear weapons still exist, that some nuclear-weapon States are increasing their nuclear capacities and that all nuclear-weapon States are not only holding on to the logic of nuclear deterrence but also modernizing their nuclear weapons systems. Switzerland continues to urge the nuclear-weapon States to fully implement their obligations under article VI of the Treaty and to engage in good-faith negotiations on further nuclear disarmament steps.

7. Switzerland is of the view that nuclear weapons do not contribute to international security, but represent a grave risk for both international and human security. At the 2010 Review Conference, all States parties to the Treaty expressed their "deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons". Switzerland has supported the joint statements on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. Switzerland has also facilitated efforts by civil society to advance the humanitarian dimension by highlighting the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and, in particular, the consequences that they would have if such weapons were ever used again. Switzerland actively participated in the second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, hosted by Mexico in February 2014, and has welcomed the offer by the Government of Austria to hold a follow-up conference later in 2014.

8. Switzerland is deeply concerned at the lack of progress in both the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Switzerland is of the view that the continuing deadlock has weakened the multilateral disarmament system and that this situation is rooted in institutional deficiencies, as well as lacking political will. Together with other States, Switzerland has called for a debate on the revitalization of the disarmament machinery, including the Conference. Several proposals were made to overcome the current deadlock. Switzerland welcomes the fact that the members of the Conference have considered such proposals and are implementing some of the recommendations made with regard to the working methods. The issue of revitalization remains on the agenda of the General Assembly. We call upon the international community to continue to explore, consider and consolidate options, proposals and elements for a revitalization of the United Nations disarmament machinery as a whole, including the Conference.

9. In 2013, Switzerland actively participated in the work of the Open-ended Working Group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons, which was established by the General Assembly in its resolution 67/56. Switzerland welcomed the Group's consensus report, which reflects the discussions and proposals made. Switzerland also supported the follow-up resolution (68/46) and intends to contribute to its implementation. Switzerland is of the view that the Assembly should, at its sixty-ninth session, assess progress made in the implementation of the resolution and further explore options for taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, including, if necessary, through the Open-ended Working Group.

10. Switzerland is concerned that an estimated 2,000 nuclear weapons are still on high alert, which is in direct contradiction to step 9 of the 13 practical steps and actions 5 (e) and 5 (f) of the action plan. Switzerland put forward, together with Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand and Nigeria (the De-alerting Group), during the discussions of the First Committee of the General Assembly in 2010 and 2012, a resolution on decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear-weapons systems. A 2013 study by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, commissioned by New Zealand and Switzerland and prepared by Hans Kristensen and Matthew McKinzie, *Reducing Alert Rates of Nuclear Weapons*, was presented to the First Committee at the sixty-seventh session of the Assembly, with a side event held in 2013 in Geneva at the second session of the Preparatory Committee. Switzerland has continued to argue that high alert levels are dangerous (accidents, unauthorized launch), not necessary (they vastly exceed current and foreseeable security needs) and contradict continuing efforts to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons. Switzerland is looking forward to the reporting of the nuclear-weapon States on their undertakings to implement actions 5 (e) and 5 (f) of the action plan. Together with the other members of the De-Alerting Group, Switzerland has submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.24) containing concrete suggestions for accelerating action on de-alerting, including concrete de-alerting measures to be achieved during the next Treaty cycle.

11. In accordance with paragraph 80 of the final document of the 2010 Review Conference, in which the Conference expressed "its deep concern at the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that these weapons could be used and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from the use of nuclear weapons", and in support of the implementation of action 5 (f) of the action plan, the aim of which is to reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons, Switzerland and Austria have mandated Chatham House, a think tank, to examine evidence from declassified documents, testimonies and interviews about risks associated with nuclear arsenals. The study, *Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Policies for Today*, was presented in Nayarit, Mexico, and will also be presented to the Preparatory Committee at the current session.

12. In accordance with the resolve to seek a safer world for all and to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons and in support of the implementation of action 1 of the action plan, under which all States committed themselves to pursuing policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons, Switzerland has furthered a project with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy on security in a world without nuclear weapons. The project's goal is to facilitate a dialogue on how security in a

world without nuclear weapons can be generated and what a nuclear-weapons-free world would look like.

13. Also in accordance with action 1 of the action plan, Switzerland has strengthened its legislation. In this respect, the Federal Act on War Material prohibits, since 1 February 2013, direct and indirect financing of the development, manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons.

14. Switzerland attaches great importance to the launch of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Efforts to ban fissile material relate to action 15 of the action plan. Switzerland is of the view that such an instrument should be of a multilateral character, non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable and should cover the future production and existing stocks of fissile material. In 2013, Switzerland supported General Assembly resolution 67/53 and submitted its views in response to the request of the Secretary-General.

Pillar 2 (actions 24 to 46 of the action plan)

15. Since its entry into force more than 40 years ago, the Treaty has largely achieved what was expected of it in terms of non-proliferation. The much-feared large-scale proliferation of nuclear arms has not come to pass.

16. Nevertheless, the risk of proliferation is still present, as illustrated by some unresolved cases. The international community must therefore continue to spare no effort to ensure the success of this key pillar. Indeed, more States with nuclear weapons will lead to a less secure world in which the already existing risks with unacceptable catastrophic humanitarian consequences would increase.

17. Switzerland therefore calls upon States that have created proliferation concerns to fully comply with their non-proliferation obligations by addressing all non-compliance matters with their safeguards obligations in order to uphold the authority of the safeguards system.

18. Switzerland is convinced that only a diplomatic approach to proliferation cases will lead to sustainable solutions. In this spirit, Switzerland has supported the resumption of the negotiating process between the E3/EU+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran by hosting several meetings that led to the adoption, in Geneva in November 2013, of a joint plan of action.

19. In the same spirit, Switzerland has actively supported the efforts of the facilitator to prepare the ground for a conference for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction, by hosting several meetings between the States of the region and the co-conveners.

20. Switzerland has consistently underlined the need to universalize the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system by calling upon all States parties that have not yet done so to bring into force without delay an IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement in accordance with the provisions of article III of the Treaty. Switzerland also calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States. In the meantime, Switzerland urges those States remaining outside the Treaty safeguards system to remedy this situation as a matter of priority.

21. Switzerland supports the efforts to universalize complementary instruments that, just as the Additional Protocol, have proved invaluable in strengthening the

non-proliferation regime. Switzerland is of the view that a comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with an additional protocol, should constitute the safeguards standard. Switzerland encourages all States parties that have not yet done so — in particular those with significant nuclear activities — to conclude and bring into force an additional protocol with IAEA.

22. Since the 2010 Review Conference, Switzerland has supported the efforts of the IAEA secretariat to further develop the State-level concept by launching various initiatives. Switzerland is of the view that optimizing the safeguards system, with a less mechanical approach that better reflects the specificities of each State, will enable IAEA to focus its efforts where they are most needed. Switzerland encourages all States parties to support the current conceptual work of the secretariat. It is indeed in all States parties' interest to provide IAEA with the tools to better meet future challenges.

23. As Chair for 2014 of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Switzerland has been supporting a project to support participating States members of OSCE in their efforts to build national capacity and the legislative basis to implement Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1977 (2011). The project is a concrete contribution to raising regional awareness and fostering closer cooperation among all relevant regional and national stakeholders, as well as to global efforts to facilitate implementation of those resolutions and to strengthen OSCE expertise and capacity in this respect.

24. Switzerland is convinced that strengthening nuclear security deserves the commitment of all State parties to the Treaty. Switzerland therefore is a State party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to its Amendment, to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and to the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Switzerland also participated at a high level in the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Security, held in July 2013, and in the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit held in The Hague. At both meetings, Switzerland emphasized the importance of strengthening the security of all nuclear material, including that used in nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Switzerland is a member of the Group of Eight Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

Pillar 3 (actions 47 to 64 of the action plan)

25. Switzerland is convinced that the best way to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities are sufficient, assured and predictable is by placing the Technical Cooperation Fund within the regular budget of IAEA. As in the past, Switzerland continues, in the context of the IAEA General Conference, to raise this issue and to underline the inherent risks generated by any approach promoting extrabudgetary contributions.

26. Switzerland is convinced that nuclear safety is an issue of a global nature and that strengthening nuclear safety deserves the commitment of all State parties to the Treaty. Switzerland therefore is a State party to all international conventions in the field of nuclear safety.

27. In this context, Switzerland successfully submitted to the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, at their sixth review meeting, held in Vienna in

April 2014, a proposal to convene a diplomatic conference to negotiate an amendment in order to strengthen the Convention.

28. Furthermore, Switzerland supports a rapid and complete implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, which was adopted in September 2011. The Plan contains useful tools to strengthen nuclear safety, such as the establishment of peer review missions on a regular basis, greater transparency on the part of national authorities in the publication of their reports and in the implementation of recommendations of peer review missions and the use of the state-of-the-art technology.